

Summit for Space Sustainability

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Militarization and Potential Conflict in Space

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Presentation Overview

- 1. Global Counterspace Dynamic
- 2. Space Security in the Era of Hybrid Operations
- 3. Economic and Financial Operations as a Counterspace Threat
- 4. Key Challenges Ahead
- 5. Conclusion

Summit for Space Sustainability, Washington, DC, June 25, 2019 Militarization and Potential Conflict in Space



1. Global Counterspace Dynamic

- Driven by China Russia U.S. rivalries
- Other nations seeking space capability for national security reasons (e.g. India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, etc.)
- Non-reversible, destructive ASAT capabilities are among the most prominent concerns
- "Grey zone" spectrum of threats associated with deliberate, reversible actions by state actors which are asymmetric in their knock-on effects
- Heightened concern over terrestrial disputes cascading into space due to a deteriorating geopolitical environment among the major space powers.



Directed Energy Weapon - an Artist Depiction (Credit: U.S. Defense Department)

Summit for Space Sustainability, Washington, DC, June 25, 2019 Militarization and Potential Conflict in Space



2. Space Security in the Era of Hybrid Operations

| Space Hybrid Operation | Examples |
|--|---|
| Directed Energy Operations that May Result in Space Debris | Low-Power Laser Dazzling or Blinding High-Power Microwave (HPM) or Ultrawideband (UWB) Emitters |
| Orbital Operations that Generally Do Not Result in Space Debris | Space Object Tracking and Identification; Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) |
| Electronic Operations | Jamming (Orbital/Uplink, Terrestrial/Downlink) Spoofing |
| Cyber Operations | Attack on satellite or ground station antennas Attack on ground stations connected to terrestrial networks Attack on user terminals that connect to satellites |
| Economic and Financial (E&F) Operations | Investments in targeted country's space infrastructure for purpose of influence/control. Provision of subsidized loans, launch services, ground stations, GNSS services, etc. for a targeted country's space system(s) |





3. Economic and Financial Operations as a Counterspace Threat



PSSI's Global Map of Chinese and Russian Space Transactions (as of March 31, 2019)



4. Key Challenges Ahead

- Inherently dual-use nature of most space capabilities (even seemingly benign civilian technologies can have counterspace applications)
- Temptation of state actors to exploit asymmetric space vulnerabilities
- Deployment of capabilities that disrupt or deny space benefits temporarily and reversibly
- Ambiguous attribution concerning hostile actions/activities
- Proliferation of space-related threats stemming from technological innovations
- Competing models for space partnering arrangements among state actors
- Cyber threats and economic and financial (E&F) predations in particular could cause major disruptions in the regional balance of power, as well as global space security.



5. Conclusion

- Absent active diplomacy that enhances transparency and promotes confidence, incidents and even conflict involving space domain are likely and fairly near-term
- Behavioral norms and best practices can serve as a rules-based beacon that guides a future space traffic management regime
- Policies should focus on: greater awareness of the multitude of threats; resilient architectures; creative deterrence options; response/crisis management procedures; secure incident reporting between public and private actors; capacity-building; and sustainable space partnerships.